U.S. response to SoCal wildfire questioned

U.S. response to SoCal wildfire questioned

4 November 2009

USA —

On a sizzling August morning, as flames burned unchecked down the road, fire crews milled about at an Angeles Crest Highway ranger station. Others were parked along the pavement – a critical line of defense – their engines quiet and hoses slack.

It was more than an hour after first light, and some six hours after U.S. Forest Service commanders had determined that the fire required a more aggressive air attack. But the skies remained empty of water-dropping helicopters – tankers that were readily available.

Then, after the sun had heated the hillsides above La Canada Flintridge, a city in the foothills about 15 miles north of downtown Los Angeles, and as the first chopper finally began unloading on the flames, the fire gathered speed and shot over the highway, turning tall pines into torches. The last best chance to stop the blaze without significant losses vanished.

“That’s what turned into the Station fire,” said one firefighter who saw the flames jump the road about 8 a.m. on Aug. 27.

Drawn from interviews and records, a picture of the fateful Day 2 of the Station fire raises troubling new questions about the U.S. Forest Service’s response to the blaze when it was still small and considered relatively easy to contain.

The conflagration eventually led to the deaths of two Los Angeles County firefighters, destroyed about 90 dwellings and devastated one of the United States’ most-visited national forests. The largest fire in county history, it was not fully contained until Oct. 16.

The Forest Service should have pounced on the flames as soon as light filled the sky, when the ground was cool and the winds were down, said the firefighter who was at the scene. Like others with knowledge of the operation, he requested anonymity because he is not authorized to speak publicly about the matter.

“Air tankers should have been there 30 minutes before sunup,” he said. “These folks knew what kind of fire they had going below the road, and they did not staff it with adequate resources. There is no excuse for that.”

Although the Forest Service has acknowledged that it learned overnight it had underestimated the threat posed by the fire, witnesses said no helicopter hit the blaze until at least 90 minutes after first light. Two choppers from the city and county of Los Angeles -crucial reinforcements – did not reach the fire until 10 a.m., fire officials said. By then, it had multiplied many times in size.

Later in the day, as the blaze raged out of control, commanders rejected recommendations from firefighters for more aircraft, including DC-10s to dump retardant, according to the firefighter who was there. By twilight, the flames would consume about 500 acres.

More precise timeline and deployment information was not available. Forest Service officials declined to be interviewed, citing an internal investigation into the agency’s handling of the fire.

“It is premature to draw conclusions as to what could have been done differently to contain the Station fire before completion of the formal review, an in-depth and comprehensive process that has helped our dedicated firefighters to contain more than 98 percent of fires during initial attack,” Tom Tidwell, the Washington, D.C.-based chief of the Forest Service, said in an e-mailed statement.

Conditions on the second day were ominous. There was little wind that morning, but temperatures were headed to the 100-degree mark, and the chaparral along Angeles Crest Highway was thick and dry; it had not burned in many years.

Forest Service officials and other experts had long warned that any blaze in those lower reaches of the forest, above the foothill communities, could quickly turn into an epic and ruinous fire.

Even so, a Los Angeles Times photographer saw crews standing at the Angeles Crest Ranger Station – which gave the fire its name – perhaps in a briefing or awaiting assignment, as the blaze continued to gain momentum. He was there when the crews were deployed later to the spot where the flames leaped over the road.

Some firefighters were pulling on their gear while others hurriedly unrolled hoses, all too late to halt the advance of the blaze, Times photos show. A helicopter is captured in the photos dumping water after 9 a.m.

Once it got away, the fire – now suspected to be arson – would go on to char 160,577 acres, wipe out homes in Big Tujunga Canyon and turn ancient stands of trees to cinders. The cost of fighting it has been estimated at nearly $100 million, with property losses and recovery expenses yet to be tallied.

The two firefighters were killed on the fifth day, when their truck plunged into a deep canyon.

The Forest Service probe was launched after the Times reported that the agency erred in concluding that the fire presented little danger at the end of the first day and thus scaled back its response.

Three weeks before the fire, the Forest Service issued a memorandum directing its Southern California managers to trim expenses by reducing the use of reinforcements from municipal departments and the state.

Los Angeles County Fire Department ground crews and helicopters played a vital role in containing the Station blaze to 15 acres on Day 1, but the Forest Service did not ask them to return in the same numbers the next day, according to interviews and records.

In previous interviews, before the Forest Service stopped releasing information, Angeles Forest Fire Chief David Conklin told the Times that costs never influenced his decisions on reinforcements. He said his commanders had realized in the small hours of Aug. 27, between 1 a.m. and 2 a.m., that they needed more help from the county and the Los Angeles Fire Department.

The county was subsequently asked for two helicopters but provided only one, a decision that has since been criticized.

Nevertheless, the Forest Service did not deploy the city and county heli-tankers until several hours after they could have begun flying, fire officials said.

Because of the increased risk of flying in darkness, the Forest Service has a policy of not making aerial water dumps at night – something that is routinely done by the city and county. Forest Service and county officials also have said that much of the terrain where the fire flared up in the morning was too treacherous for ground crews.

“The overriding concern was firefighter safety,” said County Fire Chief P. Michael Freeman, who added that his department sent ground crews to the blaze at 6 a.m. at the Forest Service’s request.

But the hazards do not explain the delay in putting air tankers to work as morning broke on Day 2. If the area was too steep for ground crews to confront the fire, even in daylight, that should have only heightened the need for helicopter drops as early as possible, firefighters say.

Glenn Smith, command pilot for the city department, said its heli-tanker could have begun dousing the flames at dawn.

Deployment records obtained by the Times also show that the Forest Service did not pull in air tankers from the state Department of Forestry and Fire Protection until the third day of the blaze, although they were available from the start.

Conklin and county Chief Deputy John Tripp have said they believed they had enough aircraft to combat the fire on the second day.

After the Times began examining the tactics used in the fire, the Forest Service and the county department said in September that they planned to change their procedures so that the two agencies immediately stage a joint assault on any blaze in the lower Angeles National Forest.

Meanwhile, the firefighter who witnessed the Station blaze bound across the highway said he is still shaken by thoughts of a missed opportunity.

“It just amazes me that they allowed the fire to escape like that,” he said. “It’s very frustrating to see that happen and then to have a tragic loss of life.”

24. November 2017/by GFMCadmin